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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the differing concepts of total war, and the 
resulting policies and strategies for their acceptance pursued from 
1941 to 1945 by four prominent National Socialist leaders, Martin 
Bormann, Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbels and Albert Speer. Speer 
and Goebbels suggested, and later historians have agreed, that the 
National Socialist government only reluctantly oriented its economic 
and social production to the war effort. A study of the policies and 
ideas of these men is important to see whether this was the case.
In examining the policies of the leadership, the thesis argues 
that previous interpretations of the National Socialist political system 
as either polycratic or monocratic have become too polarised. Instead 
it shows the existence at this level of both monocratic and polycratic 
elements of authority; but finally it emphasizes the importance of 
Hitler's authority for the pursuit of total war policies. It suggests the 
origins of this authority should be seen in the charismatic nature of 
his rule.
The changing policies which these men pursued both in their 
own areas of responsibility and in the wider German society indicate 
that they supported total war. There were d ifferences in the 
emphasis on the policies to be followed. Early efforts to win more 
German workers to the armaments industry and the front in 1941-42 
foundered on the availability of foreign labour and a failure to realize 
the seriousness of Germany's position. Speer and Goebbels supported 
a more economically efficient and rational use of resources and 
labour in the period 1943-44. Their efforts to make women liable for 
labour and to close inessential businesses met with some support 
from Hitler after Stalingrad, when a Committee of Three was set up to 
enforce the measures. This committee failed to make all the changes 
the two men thought necessary  but their expec ta t ions  were 
unrealistic. From 1943 on there was also support in the leadership for 
ideological mobilization and, eventually, paramilitary forces as a 
contribution to preventing defeat.
In addition to their emphasis on the economically rational use 
of resources, Goebbels and Speer were also aware o f the need for 
burdens of the war to appear to be equally distributed. Himmler 
supported total war but his interpretation was more ideological. He
supported  administrative simplification and sought to increase the 
role of the SS in economic production. By 1944 he was willing to 
abandon certain ideological precepts to prolong the life of the regime. 
Bormann's view of the need to orient the home front for the pursuit 
o f the war was also more ideological; he also represented Hitler's 
opinions. For Goebbels in particular the policies of total war were to 
be combined with moves towards a compromise peace to allow the 
regime to remove itself from the war.
The thesis demonstrates that these members of the leadership 
did agree on the need for total war; in particular on the need for 
adm inis tra tive  simplification and greater use of labour reserves. 
Some o f their policies foundered on opposition from Hitler; in other 
cases their expectations of what else could be achieved were 
unrealistic or foundered on other systemic constraints.
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1ABBREVIATIONS AND GERMAN TERMS
Abt. - (Abtei lung)  - department.
Abt. Pers.  - Abtei lung Personal  - personnel department.
A l l g e m e i n e s  H e e r e s a m t  - general army office.
A r b e i t s e i n s a t z  - mobilization of labour.
av. - a rb e i t s v e rw e n d u n g s fa h ig  - capable of work.
AW A - Al lgem eines  W eh rm a ch tsa m t  - General armed forces office.
BA - Bundesarchiv  - German Federal Archives, Koblenz.
BA MA - Bundesarchiv  Mil i tararchiv  -German Federal Military Archives, 
Freiburg.
B e r e i t s s t e l l u n g s s c h e i n  - certificate showing availability for call-up.
Chef.  H.L. - Chef  Heeres lei tung - head of the army leadership.
Chef.  H. Riist u. BdE - Chef  Heeresri istung und Befehlshaber des 
E r s a t z h e e r e s  - head of army armaments and commander of the 
Replacement Army.
DAF - Deutsche Arbeits Front - German Labour Front.
D e u ts c h e  F rau en w e rk  - German Women's Enterprise, Nazi-led federation of 
women's groups from 1934 to 1945.
D reier  Aussch uss  - Committee of Three.
E r s a t z h e e r  - Replacement Army.
F e r n s c h r e i b e n  - teleprint or teletype message.
F r a u e n s c h a f t  - Women's League of the NSDAP.
F i i h r e r h a u p t q u a r t i e r  - main Fiihrer headquarters.
F i i h r e r i n f o r m a t i o n  - submission.
g. - geheim - secret.
G a u  - region, the main territorial division of the NSDAP.
G a u l e i t e r  -Nazi Party functionary responsible for administration in a 
province or federal state.
GBA - G en era lbevo l lm achti g te r  fiir den Arbe it se insa tz  - General 
plenipotentiary for employment.
GBK or GBTK - Generalbevol lmacht ig ter  fiir den Totalen Krieg - 
General plenipotentiary for total war.
GBV - G e n e r a lb e v o l lm a c h t ig t e r  fiir den R e ic h s v e r w a l t u n g  - General 
plenipotentiary for Reich administration, Interior Minister.
G e n G o u v  - G e n e r a l g o u v e r n e m e n t  - General Government, administration 
of unannexed sections of central occupied Poland.
Gestapo - Geheime Staats Polizei  - Secret State Police.
gK - geheime K om m andosache  - military top secret.
gR- g e h e i m e  R e ic hssa che  - civilian top secret.
g v .H .  - g a r n i s o n s v e r w e n d u n g s f a h i g  H e im a t  - capable of serving in a 
garrison on the home front.
G l i e d e r u n g e n  - Formations or divisions; the collective name for paramilitary 
groups and other sections, including the Hitler Youth.
H a u p t a m t  - Main Office.
H a u p t s c h u l e  - high school.
H a u s h a l t s a b t e i l u n g  - budget section or office.
H W aA - H eeres w af fenamt - army weapons office.
H o h e i t s t r a g e r  - ’Bearer of sovereignty', title given to territorial chiefs in the 
PO.
HSSPF - Hohere SS- und Polizei  Fiihrer - Higher SS and Police Leaders.
IfZ  - Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte, Munich.
2K a m p f z e i t  - literally period of struggle, period before the N SD A P  came to 
power.
KDF - Kraft durch Freude - Strength through Joy, a D A F  programme for 
worker recreation.
KL - K o nz en tra t io n s la g er  - concentration camp.
Kreis le i ter  -district party leader.
KTB C hef  Wi Amt - Kriegstagebuch Chef  Wirtschaftsamt - war diary of 
the head of the armed forces' economic office.
K r i s t a l l n a c h t  - night of broken glass, government sponsored anti-Semitic 
pogrom in November 1938.
kv.  - k r i e g s v e r w e n d u n g s f a h i g  - fit for active service.
L a n d e r  - province, administrative and government unit.
Leiter Pro. - Leiter Propaganda - head of the propaganda section.
L u f t k r i e g s s c h a d e n a u s s c h u s s  - air war damage committee.
M a c h t e r g r e i f u n g  - N SDAP  seizure of power in 1933.
M - B e a u f t r a g t e n  - M o b i l i s a t i o n s - B e a u f t r a g t e n  - mobilization deputies.
M i n i s t e r r a t s v e r o r d n u n g  - ministerial council decree.
NL - Nachlass  - private papers.
N S D A P  - Na t io nal sozia l is t i s che Deutsche Arbe iter  Parte i  - National 
Socialist (Nazi) GermanWorkers' Party.
N SFO  - N a t io n a l s o z ia l i s t i s c h e  F i ihrun g so f f i z ie r  - National Socialist 
leadership officer in the armed forces.
N S K K  - N a t i o n a l s o z ia l i s t i s c h e  K ra f t f a h r e r -K o r p s  - National Socialist 
Automobile Corps.
N S K O V  - N a t i o n a l s o z i a l i s t i s c h e  K r i e g s o p f e r v e r s o r g u n g  - National 
Socialist war victims' welfare.
N S - R e i c h s k r i e g e r b u n d  - National Socialist war veterans' league.
NSV  - N a t io n a l s o z ia l i s t i s c h e  V o lk s w o h l f a h r t  - National Socialist welfare 
organization.
OKH - Oberkommando des Heeres - Supreme Command of the Army.
OKL - Oberkommando der Luftwaffe - Supreme Command of the Air Force.
OKM - Oberkommando der Marine - Supreme Command of the Navy.
O KW - Oberkommando  der Wehrmacht  - Supreme Command of the armed 
forces.
ORBs - Oberste Reichs Behorden - Supreme Reich authorities.
O stm in ist er ium ,  or RMO - R e ichsmin is ter ium fiir die besetzten
O s t g e b i e t e  - Reich ministry for the occupied Eastern territories.
OT - Organisation Todt - building organization involving state building 
administration and private firms.
P er s o n l i c h er  Stab Reichsf i ihrer  SS - Personal Staff of the Reichsfiihrer 
of the SS.
Pg. - Parteigenosse - Party comrade; party member.
PK - Partei -Kanzle i  - Party Chancellery.
PO - Pol it ische Organisation - political organization; cadre for mobilizing 
N SD A P  political activists.
Prom i - Propaganda  M in is ter ium - Propaganda Ministry.
RAD - R eic hsarbe it sd ien s t  - Reich Labour Service.
R e i c h s p o s t d i r e k t i o n e n  - Reich post management offices.
R e ic h s b e v o l lm a c h t ig t e  fiir den to ta len  Krieg - Reich plenipotentiary 
for total war.
RFSS - Reichsf i ihrer-SS - Reich leader of the SS.
RK - Reichskanzle i  - Reich Chancellery.
RK - Reichskommissar - Reich commissioner; title of a Nazi chief of civilian 
administration in the occupied areas of Europe.
RKFDV - Re ic hskom m issar  fiir die Fes t igung D euts chen  Volkstums
Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom.
RKO - Reichskom missaria t  Ostland - Reich commissariat Eastland; the 
territorial administrative area for the Baltic countries.
RKU - R e ic hsk om m issar ia t  Ukra ine  - Reich commissariat Ukraine.
RL - Reichslei tung - Reich leadership; top level bureaucratic 
decisionmaking entity of NSDAP.
RM - Reichsmarks - German unit of currency.
RPA * Reic hspro pagandaam ter - Reich propaganda offices.
RPL - Re ichspropaga nda le i tu ng - propaganda leadership; N SD A P  
propaganda office.
RS HA - R e ic h s s i ch er h e i t s h a u p ta m t  - Reich Security or R SSH A  Main 
Office.
RuSHa - Rasse- und S ied lungs-H auptamt - Race and Settlement Main 
Office of the SS.
SA - Sturm Abtei lung - Storm troop(s).
S -B etr ie be - Spe rr -B e tr ie b e  - blocked firms, in the occupied territories 
whose employees were protected from transport to Germany
S c h e i n a r b e i t  - illusory employment, nominal employment designed to 
prevent the employee from being called on for actual labour.
S c h l i i s s e l k r a f t e  - key workers, protected from call up because of their 
importance to the war effort.
S c h n e l l b r i e f  - priority letter.
SD - Sicherhe itsdiens t  - Security Service (SS secret intelligence unit).
SE - Sond ererz iehung - special call up programme (known as SEI, etc.)
SS - Schutzstaffel  - Guard squadrons.
S S - F i i h r u n g s h a u p t a m t  - SS Leadership Main Office.
uk - u nabkom m lich  - indispensable workers.
V e r o r d n u n g s b l a t t e r  - decree paper.
VJH - Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, Munich.
V o l k s g e m e i n s c h a f t  - national community.
v o l k i s c h  - national, racial, of the folk.
Volkstum - Germandom.
Volkssturm - 'People's Storm’; militia organization.
VoMi - Vo lksdeutsche Mitte ls te l le  - Liaison Office for Ethnic Germans.
V W H A  - V e rw al tu ngs -  und W ir t sc h a f t s -H a u p ta m t  - Main Office for 
Administration and the Economy of the SS.
WaA - Waffen Amt - Weapons Office.
W a r t h e g a u  - German Gau set up in the west of occupied Poland.
W e h r h i l f s d i e n s t  - armed forces' auxiliary service.
W e h r m a c h t s s a n i t a t s w e s e n s  - armed forces' medical service.
W e h r e r s a t z d i e n s t s t e l l e n  - armed forces' recruiting offices.
W e h r e r s a t z p l a n  - armed forces' replacement plan.
W e h r w i r t s c h a f t  - defence economy.
W e h r p f l i c h t i g e  - those liable for military service.
W F S t.  - W e h r m a c h t s f i ih r u n g s s t a b  - armed forces' leadership staff.
WiRiiAmt - Wehrwirt schaft s-  und Ri i s tungsam t - war economy and 
armaments office.
W VHA - W irts chaf ts -  und V e rw a l tu n g s - H a u p ta m t  - Main Office for 
Economy and Administration in the SS (reorganization of V W H A ).
4LIST OF LESS WELLKNOWN LEADERS
Amann,  Max - Head of NSDAP publishing house, 1933-45.
Backe,  Herber t  - State secretary in the Reich ministry of agriculture
1933-42; acting minister of agriculture 1942-45.
Berger,  Gottlob - Head of the SS main administrative office 1938-45;
Himmler's personal liaison officer with the Ostministerium.
Brandt ,  Ru do lf  - Himmler's personal adjutant; second in command of the 
Reichfiihrer-SS Personlicher Stab.
Biirckel,  J ose f  - Gauleiter of the Palatinate 1933-44; Reich commissioner in 
Lorraine, 1940-44.
Daluege,  Kurt - Head of the state police, 1936-45.
Darr6, R. Walther - Reich minister of agriculture, 1933-42.
Dietrich,  Otto - Reich press chief, 1933-45.
Florian,  Karl - Gauleiter of Diisseldorf, 1933-45.
Frank,  Hans - Governor-General of Poland, 1939-45.
Frick,  Wilhelm - Interior Minister, 1933-43.
F r iedr ic hs ,  H e lm u th  - head of the party division of the Party Chancellery,
1934-45.
Funk, Walther  - Reich Minister of economics, 1938-45.
G anz en m i i l l e r ,  T eo d o r  - State secretary in the Transport Ministry.
Hanke, Karl - State secretary in the Propaganda Ministry, 1933-40; Gauleiter 
of Lower Silesia, 1941-45.
Henlein,  Konrad - Gauleiter of the Sudetenland, 1938-45.
Heydrich,  Re inhard  - Head of the SD, 1933-1942; Reich Protector in Bohemia 
and Moravia, 1941-42.
H ild ebrandt ,  F r ie dr ic h  - Gauleiter of Mecklenburg, 1933-45.
Hildebrandt ,  Richard  - Head of the SS Race and Settlement Office.
H offm ann ,  A lb er t  - Leading trouble shooter in the Party Chancellery;
deputy Gauleiter of Upper Silesia, 1941-43; Gauleiter of Westphalia- 
South, 1943-45.
Holz, Karl - Acting Gauleiter of Franconia, 1940-45.
Ifland,  Otto - Party Chancellery official since 1938; Party Chancellery 
representative on von Unruh commission 1943.
Jiittner,  Max - Head of the leadership office of the SS.
Kaufmann,  Karl  - Gauleiter of Hamburg, 1933-45.
Klopfer ,  Gerhard  - Head of the state division of the Party Chancellery,
1938-45.
Koch,  Erich - Gauleiter of East Prussia, 1933-45; Reich commissioner in the 
Ukraine, 1941-45.
Kruger,  Friedrich W. - Head of the SS in occupied Poland, 1941-43.
Meyer,  Alfred - Gauleiter of Westphalia North, 1933-45; state secretary in the 
Ostministerium, 1941-45.
Milch,  Erhard - Luftwaffe Field-Marshal and Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe. 
M u tsc hm a n n ,  Mart i n  - Gauleiter of Saxony, 1933-45.
Ohlendorf ,  Otto - Head of SD  Amt Inland.
Pohl,  Oswald - Reich treasurer of the SS, 1936 on; head of the SS economic 
administration office, 1942-45.
Prii tzmann,  Hans - HSSPF to Southern Army Group, Kiev, 1941-43.
Sauckel ,  Fri tz - Gauleiter of Thuringia, 1933-45; Reich plenipotentiary for 
labour, 1942-45.
Simon,  Gustav - Gauleiter of Koblenz-Trier, 1933-45; chief of civil 
administration in Luxemburg, 1940-45.
Stu ck ar t ,  Fra nz - State secretary in the Interior Ministry.
Tiessler,  Walter  - Liaison officer of the Party Chancellery to the Propaganda 
Ministry, 1940-43.
5Wagner,  Robert  - Gauleiter of Baden, 1933-45; Reich commissioner in Alsacc, 
1940-45.
Wahl,  Karl - Gauleiter of Swabia, 1933-45.
W a l k e n h o r s t ,  H e in r ic h  - Head of the personnel office of the party 
chancellery, 1942-45.
Wegener,  Paul  - Gauleiter of Weser-Ems, 1942-45.
Weiszacker,  Ernst  von - State secretary in Foreign Ministry to 1943;
Ambassador to the Vatican 1943-45.
Zander ,  W i lhe lm  - Head of the party chancellery section on mobilization 
affairs, 1937-45.
Details taken from Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (revised 
edition, London, 1971), pp. 552-67 and Dietrich Orlow, The History of 
the Nazi Party II: 1933-1945 (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 499-503.
6INTRODUCTION
'The German example should have provided an adequate lesson 
of the results of initiating war measures too late', wrote Germany's 
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels in March 1945.1 Since 1941 he 
had advocated policies, to which he gave the overall description of 
'total war', designed initially to ensure German victory and later to 
avert defeat. Writing just before final defeat, he suggested that the 
National Socialist government should have taken more drastic action 
to mobilize all forces for war purposes two years earlier. Instead it 
had not done enough, and where it had adopted suitable policies, it 
had done so too late. Various leading members of the regime lacked 
the nerve and energy to take the necessary decisive steps.2
Germany's Armaments Minister, Albert Speer, had been 
Goebbels' ally in 1943 in seeking to make the conduct of the war 
more total. He also judged the war effort unsatisfactory. Writing to 
Hitler in March 1945, he suggested that the regime had lost precious 
time through comfort and indolence in the period 1940-41. 'Without 
my work the war would perhaps have been lost in 1942-43'.3
1. Entry for 9 March 1945 in Hugh Trevor-Roper (ed.), Final Entries 1945 The 
Diaries of Joseph Goebbels (New York, 1978), p. 88. See also Goebbels' 
comments quoted in entries for 15 and 16 October 1944, 19 and 21 January 
1945, and 8 February 1945 in Wilfred von Oven, Finale Furioso: Mit 
Goebbels bis zum Ende (first published 1948-50, Tubingen, 1974), 
pp. 496-8, 545, 549-50, 576.
2. Entry for 4 March 1945, Trevor-Roper, Final Entries, p. 41. 'Neither in the 
military nor the civilian sector have we strong central leadership', he 
observed: entry for 7 March 1945, ibid.. p. 71. The main tenor of Goebbels' 
criticisms, however, was against the military failings of Hermann Goering 
as commander of the Luftwaffe.
3. Speer to Hitler, 29 March 1945, BA R 3/1538, p. 2.
Immediately after the war, he blamed 'the corrupt and largely 
exhausted leading group' for being 'incapable of mastering further 
developments in the later stages of the war'.4 In his memoirs 
published some twenty five years later, he suggested as additional 
reasons for the unsatisfactory organization for war on the home front 
Hitler's fear of popular unrest which made him reluctant to ask the 
population for heavier burdens, his reluctance to face unpleasant 
realities, excessive bureaucratization in the administration and armed 
forces, and the failure to employ women fully.5
Both men believed the German economy and society were not 
mobilized for 'total war', and they suggested Hitler's leadership style, 
the opposition of key leaders and the organization of the regime were 
obstacles. Their criticisms were based on an alternative model, 
sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, of 'total war', a 'design' for 
total war in Carroll's definition.6 The concept of total war will be 
examined more fully in Chapter One. It can be defined as the 
complete orientation of a society in its economic, political and social 
life for the pursuit of the war effort, involving both total mobilization 
of resources for war and the total destruction of the enemy.7 This 
thesis will examine the policies designed to achieve total war and the 
strategies for their acceptance pursued by four powerful National
7
4. Notes typed by Speer after the war, probably at Nuremberg, 'AH/III/Blatt 
13’, B A  R 3/1626, p. 8. He expressed similar views in his post-war 
interrogations: J.K. Galbraith, 'The Speer Interrogation: Last Days of the 
Third Reich', Atlantic. July 1979, p. 52.
5. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London, 1970), on Hitler's fear of 
unrest, p. 214; Hitler's reluctance to face reality about enemy capacity and 
to relinquish his building projects, pp. 165, 168, 181; excessive 
bureaucratization, p. 213; the failure to employ women, pp. 220-1.
6. Berenice Carroll, Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third
Reich (The Hague, 1968), p. 9.
7. ihil
8Socialist leaders, Martin Bormann, the Secretary to the Fiihrer and 
head of the Party Chancellery, the Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, 
Goebbels and Speer. It will set out how and why these views changed 
and competed, and will suggest that some of the competition arose 
because of differing concepts of total war. It will compare their 
proposals to Hitler's views, where these are known, and to the 
measures which Hitler approved. It will examine the extent to which 
Speer and Goebbels' assessments of whether policies failed, and why, 
were accurate. In studying these leaders' views the following 
questions arise. What were the proposals of the four leaders? What 
concepts of total war underpinned them? How did the leaders seek to 
have their ideas introduced? If they failed, why was this the case? At 
this level of the leadership, what were the reasons for the delay 
perceived by Goebbels and Speer in adopting total war policies? By 
studying the policies of several National Socialist leaders on total war 
issues, the thesis will assess whether Hitler's attitudes and decisions, 
leadership rivalries, conflicting ideas and/or the workings of the 
National Socialist political system affected the adoption of these 
proposals. It will seek to explain if the regime failed to mobilize for 
total war at the highest levels, and if so why.
The proposals for total war put forward by Goebbels in 1942- 
43, which were part of a more general 'package' aimed at avoiding 
defeat, and his attempts to have them adopted are used as a central 
focus for a study of the leaders' concepts of total war. By comparing 
Goebbels' ideas and actions to those of other leaders, and by 
examining the manner in which the leaders sought to have their ideas 
adopted, the workings of the National Socialist system of government 
at the highest levels will be further clarified.
The thesis concentrates on the period from winter 1941 to the 
end of the war in 1945, a period which saw the deterioration of
9Germany's military position and the beginning of Goebbels' campaign 
to have total war policies adopted, the setting up of the Dreier 
Ausschuss. a committee to implement such measures, and the 
eventual appointment of Goebbels as Reich plenipotentiary for total 
war (Reichsbevollmachtigter fur den totalen Krieg) in July 1944. It 
thus also studies a political system coming under increased stress, in 
which resources were becoming scarcer and competition for them 
accordingly fiercer, and in which options were steadily decreasing. In 
assessing the leaders' response to Germany's situation, the thesis will 
bear in mind that 'neither thorough planning of production nor the 
timely mobilization of every last potential reserve could have saved 
Germany'8 once her enemies included three economic powers (the 
United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain) who could out­
produce her and if a compromise peace was excluded by her enemies.
The thesis will not seek to re-examine the details of German 
economic mobilization for war, wartime labour policy, propaganda, or 
armaments production itself, all of which have been studied in other 
works, but will draw on these studies to examine what part these 
played in the leaders' conceptions of total war. Goebbels' total war 
policy after 1942 was part of a wider attempt to seek a political 
solution of the war. Studies of proposals for a compromise peace, the 
treatment of the Jews and of the Eastern peoples will accordingly be 
drawn on where they form a component of the debate on total war. 
The thesis will concentrate, as the leaders did, on the social and 
labour prerequisites of total war. There was far less debate on the 
allocation of resources for production, increasingly under Speer's 
control in the period under study, or about the military strategies to 
be followed, which were Hitler's responsibility. For reasons which will
8. Gustav Stolper, Karl Hauser and Knut Borchardt, The German Economy 
1870 to the Present (second edition, London, 1967), p. 163.
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be developed in Chapter One, it was difficult for the leaders to 
criticize the military conduct of the war, because this entailed 
criticizing Hitler, and they tended not to do so.
Since the focus of the thesis is on the policies supported by the 
leadership, their underlying concepts and the reasons for the 
leadership's failure to agree, it will not examine the implementation 
and/or effectiveness of the policies at the local level, except where 
this came to the attention of the leadership and affected the policies 
they sought to pursue. The implementation of total war policies is a 
separate important question for study, but it presents considerable 
difficulties. It would be a useful supplement to the current study. 
This would, however, be the subject of several theses, requiring 
extensive regional comparisons and presenting considerable problems 
in finding sources, particularly for the Eastern Gaus. The 
implementation of total war policies during the war varied from 
region to region, and depended on the policies and attitudes of local 
party leaders, the economy of the area, and its location, particularly 
whether the area was heavily bombed or not.
The four leaders who have been chosen for analysis were all 
significant and powerful members of the regime, and their powers 
and responsibilities increased from 1941. Speer organized the 
armaments economy in this period; Himmler controlled the regime's 
police system and the implementation of its racial policies; Bormann, 
because of his powers in the party and his control over access to 
Hitler, could favour or thwart proposals; while Goebbels controlled the 
regime's mobilization of enthusiasm for the war. All four men had 
direct access to Hitler, enjoyed his confidence and gained powers 
directly relevant to any pursuit of total war in the period: Bormann as 
the leading member of the Dreier Ausschuss; Speer as the minister in 
charge of armaments production; Himmler as the leader of an
organization with its own economic enterprises and captive labour 
force, which also had links to the Economics and Agriculture 
Ministries; and Goebbels, both as the most vocal advocate of total war, 
and later as plenipotentiary for total war. Historians have seen all 
four men as occupying important positions on the home front during 
the war. The activities of other leaders will be considered where they 
affected the attitudes to and policies on total war of the four men 
studied. Goring, who had earlier exercised considerable power in 
economic decision making, took a less prominent role from 1941 on. 
His earlier role has been discussed in two recent studies.9
The main sources which have been used for this thesis are the 
files in the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz of the Propaganda Ministry (R 
55) and the Reichspropagandaleitung (NS 18), Goebbels' diaries (NL 
118), the Reich Ministry of Munitions and War Production (R 3), 
particularly its ministerial office, the Party Chancellery files (NS 6), 
augmented by the Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte's reconstruction of these 
files,10 the files of the Reichsfiihrer-SS's personal staff (NS 19) and 
the Reich Chancellery (R 43 II). The files of the Reich Chancellery are 
among the most comprehensive sources for the activities of the Dreier 
Ausschuss and those of the plenipotentiary for total war. Memoirs 
and interviews held by the Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte were also 
drawn on, as were the records of the trial of the major war criminals 
at Nuremberg. Military files, particularly those of the O K W  and its 
Wehrwirtschaftsriistungsamt, were examined at the Bundesarchiv
I
11
9. R.J. Overy, Goering the 'Iron Man' (London, 1984) and Stefan Martens, 
Hermann,- Goring "Erster Paladin des Fuhrers" und "Zweiter Mann im 
R e ic h " (Paderborn, 1985). On  Goring's diminishing power see Overy, 
Goering, p. 205.
10. Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Akten der Parteikanzlei Teil I (Munich, 1983- 
1985). Henceforth cited as IfZ A P K .
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Militararchiv in Freiburg. In view of Keitel's position on the Dreier 
Ausschuss, I examined these files in the expectation that Keitel also 
may have followed an independent policy or sought to promote a 
'design' for total war, but found no evidence that this was the case.11 
Nonetheless he and the head of the Reichs Chancellery, Hans 
Lam m ers,12 were in positions potentially to thwart or support such 
issues.
The private papers of Speer and Goebbels' state secretary, 
Werner Naumann, are not yet available.13 The Propaganda Ministry 
files were extensively destroyed in 194514 and survive only in a 
fragmented state, with most remaining policy files being held in the 
German Democratic Republic's archives in Potsdam. Unfortunately, I 
was not granted permission to use these files, nor to consult the files 
of the Berlin Document Center. The records of the Berlin Gau do not 
appear to have survived the war. Inquiries to various German 
archives and of various researchers revealed no trace of them.15 This
11. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel was appointed to head the High Command of 
the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht-OKW’) with a status 
equivalent to a Minister in 1938; Martin Broszat, The Hitler State (London, 
1981), p. 295. He was made a Field Marshal in 1940: Keitel to Dr. Nelte, 25 
March 1946, 'Fragen zur Person', BA  M A  N54/10, p. 1.
12. Hans Lammers was appointed Head of the Reich Chancellery with the rank 
of Reich Minister in 1937. Until Bormann's rise, he co-ordinated the 
process of legislation and instructed Hitler on issues: Broszat, Hitler State, 
pp. xiii, 283-5, and Walter Vogel and Gregor Verlande, 'Vorbemerkung',
Findbucher zu__B ggtanden________Bundesarchivs Band 13 Bestand R__41
Reichskanzlei (Koblenz. 1975), p. xlv.
13. Advice from Dr. Real, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, and Ms Elke Frohlich, 
Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte.
14. Heinz Boberach 'Die schriftliche Uberlieferung der Behorden des 
Deutschen Reiches 1875- 1945 : Sicherung, Riickfiihrung, 
Ersatzdokumentation’ in Heinz Boberach and Hans Booms (eds.), Aus der 
Arbeit des Bundesarchjvs; Beitra g e .... zum Arghivwesen, zur Que llenkiinde 
und Zeitgeschichte (Boppard am Rhein, 1978), p. 51.
15. Mr. Nathan Stoltzfus of the History Department, Harvard University, has 
advised me that he did not find the Berlin Gau files in the archives of the 
German Democratic Republic.
prevented me from examining the measures Goebbels instituted in 
his own Gau.
The post-war moral revulsion at the National Socialist regime's 
policies, particularly its extermination of the Jews, have created 
particular problems for the historian. Memoirs of survivors are less 
candid than would normally be expected; there is a reluctance to 
make some material available to researchers, for fear of the use it 
might be put to. Denial of participation in or knowledge of certain 
events is accompanied by a tendency to cast blame on those members 
of the leadership who did not survive to put forward their side of the 
story, in particular Bormann, Himmler and Goebbels. In contrast 
Speer enjoyed the survivor's advantage of setting out his version of 
events at length. The Armaments Ministry files, while extensive, 
were edited by Speer at the end of the war, as was the Chronik or 
office diary of Speer's activities.16 His post-war accounts contain a 
large degree of self-justification, as Matthias Schmidt has shown in 
Albert Speer: the end of a myth, and alternately exaggerate or 
downplay his importance, using a technique of frankness to disarm 
the reader.17 These apologetics are more subtle than those of other 
National Socialists18 but still have to be used with care, particularly 
The Slave State.19 Goebbels' account in his war time diaries also
13
16. Matthias Schmidt, Albert Speer - The End of a Mvth (London, 1985), 
pp. 14-21.
17. See the hostile assessment by General Thomas at Nuremberg quoted in 
Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (New York, 1983), pp. 433-4.
18. This can be seen in the contrast between the unpublished memoirs of 
Walter Tiessler, the liaison officer between the Propaganda Ministry and 
the Party Chancellery, 'Licht und Schatten oder Schonungsloser Wahrheit 
(1922-1945)', which are held in the Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte (IfZ), ED  
158, and Speer's memoirs.
19. Karl Dietrich Bracher, 'Die Speer Legende', Neue Politische Literatur. 15, 
1970, pp. 429-31 and 'Nur die Niederlage verhinderte den Sklavenstaat',
exaggerates his importance and effectiveness, but is still valuable as a 
reflection on the events at the time, rather than a post-war apologia. 
The major part of these diaries first became available in the 1970s, 
and consequently they have not been used by many historians of the 
period.
In addition, despite the extensive German archival holdings, 
there are gaps in the records. Hitler's personal archives, such as they 
were, were destroyed in 1945; the Goebbels diaries for the war-time 
period are incomplete and are not available for 1944; Todt's papers 
have not survived to any great extent. The fragmented state of the 
Party Chancellery files means that the extent to which Bormann 
influenced Hitler's views or merely reflected them is still not clear.
Studies of total war have so far concentrated on the questions of 
armaments production, and have tended to rely on Speer or Thomas' 
accounts of the National Socialist system. Carroll's Design for Total 
W ar  concentrates on the concept of total war of General Georg 
Thomas, head of the OKW 's Wehrwirtschaftsriistungsamt. the armed 
forces supreme command economics and armaments office, from 
1934 to 1942; Gregor Janssen's Das Ministerium Speer is a study of 
the Armaments Ministry and its increasing control over and 
achievements in armaments production;20 Jutta Sywottek has studied 
the use of propaganda to prepare the population for war.21 The study 
of the 'mobilization of enthusiasm' in the regime's wartime
14
F rankfurter___ Allgemeine Zeitung. 13 August 1981, p. 6. On Speer's
inaccuracies see Schmidt, Speer Mvth. pp. 120-2, 181-94.
20. Gregor Janssen, Das Ministerium Speer Deutschlands Rustung im Krieg 
(Frankfurt, 1968).
21. Jutta Sywottek, M-flhilmachung____fur den totalen Kriee: Die
EropagandisLischg__ Vorbere i tung___der deutschen Bevolkerung auf den
Zweiten Weltkrieg (Opladen, 1976).
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propaganda has been extensive.22 Ludolf Herbst has studied the 
debate on total war from a different perspective, that of the 
Economics Ministry and its plans for the post-war economy. He argues 
that the absence of a clear concept of a normal National Socialist 
economy made it difficult to maintain the population's willingness to 
make sacrifices.23 His main focus is on the proposals for a National 
Socialist economy which were put forward during the war to win 
popular support.24
Historians have differed in their judgements of Speer and 
Goebbels' proposals. Ulrich Herbert considered that Goebbels was 'the 
only one within the National Socialist leadership who could link a 
clear view of the actual military and economic situation of Germany 
at the change of year 1942-43 with a total concept of domestic and 
foreign policy'.25 Some of Goebbels' biographers agree with the 
assessment that he genuinely sought a mobilization of economic effort 
for the war.26 Carroll and Herbst are more critical of Goebbels' 
sincerity. Carroll claims Goebbels' design for total war 'was simply a 
prolonged, shrieking demand for "sacrifices" on the part of the 
German public'.27 Indeed she suggests that he was not innocent of the
22. See among others Jay W . Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War 
Propaganda. 1939-1945 (Minneapolis, 1974) and E. K. Bramsted, Goebbels 
and National Socialist Propaganda 1925-1945 (East Lansing, 1965).
23. Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die 
Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik. Ideologie und Propaganda
1939-1945 (Stuttgart, 1982), pp. 13-15.
24. ibid.. p. 15.
25. Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter - Politik und Praxis der "Auslander - 
Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches (Berlin, 1985), 
p. 238.
26. See, for example, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Doctor Goebbels 
(second edition, London, 1969), chapters six and seven; Viktor Reimann, 
The man who created Hitler; Joseph Goebbels (London, 1977), pp. 254,268.
27. Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 242.
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sabotage of the total war effort by the Dreier Ausschuss.28 (Her study 
concentrates on the early years of the war and does not examine 
Goebbels' proposals in any detail.) Herbst sees Goebbels' moves to 
adopt 'total war' in 1943 as a response to a crisis of the credibility of 
the regime's propaganda and does not study it in a wider context.29 
Janssen sees Goebbels' views as less soundly economically based than 
those of Speer.30 None of these historians have subjected Goebbels' 
proposals to close scrutiny. Speer on the other hand is generally given 
considerable credit for what steps were taken to mobilize the German 
economy for war in the period 1942-1944, although historians have 
been sceptical about his claims to have originated the system of 
'industrial self-responsibility' for the armaments industry, and the 
other policies which assisted increases in production.31
Historians have echoed some of Goebbels and Speer's criticisms 
of the regime's conduct of the war. They have agreed with Speer that 
female labour was never successfully mobilized.32 For ideological 
reasons 'the party left relatively untapped a large part of the 
country's labour resources'.33 Carroll, Milward and Herbst have 
suggested that Hitler sought to avoid total mobilization of Germany's
28. ibid.. pp. 242-3.
29. Herbst, Totale Krieg. p. 197. He does not appear to have been able to consult 
Goebbels' diaries or papers.
30. Janssen, Ministerium Speer, pp. 274-5.
31. Carroll, Design for Total War, p. 247; Alan S. Milward, The German Economy 
at War (London, 1967), pp. 54, 59-71.
32. Leila J. Rupp, Mobilizing___women___fax___war;___German__ and__ American
Propaganda. 1939-1945 (Princeton, 1978), p. 86; Ursula von Gersdorff, 
Frauen im Krgigsdienst 1914-194$ (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 56; William Jeffress 
Fanning Jr., 'The German war economy in 1941: a study of Germany's 
material and manpower problems in relation to the overall military effort' 
(Texas Christian University Ph.D. thesis, 1983), pp. 173-4.
33. Alan S. Milward, War. Economy and Society 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977), 
pp. 220-1.
resources for war, only began to do so reluctantly at the end of 1941, 
and did not achieve total mobilization until 1944.34 Speer himself 
suggested that the leadership did not accept the need to prepare for a 
long war until autumn 1941.35 Other reasons for this delay have been 
suggested by Mason who argues that the regime could not mobilize 
fully because it could not rely on working class support36 and Herbst 
who sees the absence of a clear National Socialist economic policy, and 
the fear that total war policies would commit the regime to a certain 
line of policy after the war, as an obstacle.37 Milward suggests that 
the organization of the National Socialist political system into ad hoc 
overlapping organizations competing for power prevented effective 
organization for total war.38 More recently a historiographical debate 
has developed whether the regime began by seeking to maintain 'a 
peacetime war economy' or whether it oriented itself from the 
beginning, however inefficiently, to a long total war. (This debate will 
be considered in Chapter Two.)
While there has been considerable study of the organization of 
the German economy and the armaments industry during the war, 
particularly based on the files of the Armaments Ministry and Speer's 
recollections, there has not been an examination of the policies, 
concepts, competition and cooperation of these four men. Individual
34. Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 10, 93; Milward, German Economy, pp. 6, 
8-16; Herbst, Totale Krieg. pp. 174-5; Edward R. Zilbert, Albert Speer and 
the Nazi Ministry of Arms: Economic Institutions and Industrial 
Production in the German war Economy (East Brunswick, 1981), 
pp. 2 2 8 ,2 3 1 .
35. Speer, Third Reich, p. 215.
36. Tim Mason, ’The Legacy of 1918 for National Socialism' in Anthony 
Nicholls and Erich Matthias (eds.), German Democracy and the Triumph of 
Hitler - Essays in recent German History (London, 1971), pp. 215-39.
37. Herbst, Totale Krieg. p. 227.
38. Milward, German Economy, pp. 8-11; see also Herbst, Totale Krieg. p. 120.
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aspects of Goebbels' campaign for total war have been studied, by 
Herbst and Longerich in particular,39 but this thesis is the first study 
of Goebbels' policy and concept of total war over the period 1941 to 
1945, drawing on Goebbels' diaries and memoranda. This is also the 
first comparative study of Bormann and Himmler's views of total war, 
and in doing so sets Goebbels and Speer's ideas in a broader 
perspective.
Before the debate on total war is examined in the succeeding 
chapters, two introductory chapters will provide information needed 
to set the debate in perspective. Chapter One will discuss the concept 
of total war in its historical context, linking this to the National 
Socialist interpretation of Germany's defeat in World War One; it will 
summarize the careers of the leaders to be studied and note the two 
differing interpretations of the National Socialist political system. 
Chapter Two will summarize the course of German preparation for 
war and note the differing interpretations of German preparedness 
for war. Each chapter concerned with the period 1941-45 will 
examine, where relevant, indications pointing to what each leader 
understood by, or advocated as, total war policies, particularly in the 
areas of simplification of the administration and the economy, 
transfers of production from less necessary to essential goods, and 
finding extra sources of labour. These views will be linked with the 
leaders' attitudes to the treatment of the peoples of the occupied East 
and the Jews, their assessment of the progress of the war, and moves 
for a compromise peace. Conflict and co-operation between the 
leaders will be examined. This will be set against the background of
39. Peter Longerich, 'Joseph Goebbels und der totale Krieg: eine unbekannte 
Denkschrift des Propagandaministers vom 18. Juli 1944', Viertelsiahrhefte 
fiir Zeitgeschichte, vol. 35, 1987, pp. 289-314.
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Germany's changing military fortunes, and the policies which Hitler 
agreed to. Chapter Three will deal with the German attack on the 
Soviet Union and its consequences which raised for the first time in 
the leadership calls for a more 'total' war effort. Chapters Four and 
Five will analyze the response to Stalingrad - Chapter Four 
concentrating on the setting up of the Dreier Ausschuss, and Chapter 
Five on Goebbels' attempts to revitalize Goring. Chapter Six will look 
at the response to Italy's leaving the war, and further moves in 1943 
to introduce total war on the Home Front. Chapters Seven and Eight 
will examine renewed attempts to have total war measures adopted 
in 1944; and Chapter Nine the results of Goebbels' appointment as 
Reichsbevollmachtigter fiir den totalen Krieg. Chapter Ten will look at 
the last attempts to pursue such policies in 1945.
